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Does the Federal Boat
Safety Act Preempt State
Common-Law Tort Claims?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 19-25. © 2002 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Is petitioner's state common-law
tort action (based on respondent's
failure to install a propeller guard on
a motorboat) preempted by either
the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971
or the Coast Guard's 1990 decision
not to require the installation of
propeller guards on recreational
boats?
FACTS
This case arises out of a boating
accident in Tennessee in which the
petitioner's wife, Jeanne Sprietsma,
fell from a motorboat and was
struck by the motor's propeller. As a
result, she suffered serious injuries
and later died. The boat was
equipped with an outboard motor
that did not have a propeller guard.
The motor was designed, manufac-
tured, and sold by respondent
Mercury Marine, a division of
Brunswick Corporation.
Petitioner Rex Sprietsma is the
administrator of the estate of his
deceased wife. He filed a wrongful
death and survival action against
Mercury Marine in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, seeking to
recover damages based on negli-
gence and strict liability for his
wife's pain and suffering, along with
the financial losses suffered by him
and his son. The complaint alleged
that the Mercury Marine boat
engine was defectively designed
because it was not equipped with a
propeller guard.
Mercury Marine moved to dismiss
on the ground that Sprietsma's
claims were preempted by the Boat
Safety Act and by the Coast Guard's
decision not to require propeller
guards. The trial court granted the
manufacturer's motion to dismiss.
The intermediate appellate court
affirmed and held that Sprietsma's
claims were expressly preempted by
the Boat Safety Act. Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 312 Ill. App.3d
1040, 729 N.E.2d 45 (2000).
(Continued on Page 20)
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On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the appellate court's
"express" preemption ruling but
held that federal law "impliedly"
preempted petitioner's claims. The
court held that the case was not
subject to the strong presumption
against federal preemption that
ordinarily applies to health and
safety issues. It declined to apply
the presumption against preemption
on the theory that federal concerns
controlled the case. The court relied
on United States v. Locke, 529 U.S.
89 (2000), which held that the pre-
sumption against preemption does
not apply to cases involving interna-
tional maritime commerce.
Next, the Illinois Supreme Court
considered the question of express
and implied preemption under the
Boat Safety Act. It concluded that
the act's broadly worded "savings
clause" (a statutory clause designed
to save certain state laws from being
preempted by federal legislation)
precluded any finding of express
preemption of common-law claims.
However, the court did hold that
Sprietsma's claims were impliedly
preempted on the theory that a jury
verdict finding Mercury Marine
liable for not installing a propeller
guard would "frustrate" federal pur-
poses. The court found that the
agency's regulatory decision not to
require guards amounted to an affir-
mative decision to preclude any
common-law claims seeking to hold
a manufacturer liable for failing to
install propeller guards. Sprietsma
v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill.2d 112,
757 NE2d 75 (2001). Sprietsma
appealed to the Supreme Court, and
certiorari was granted. Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 122 S.Ct. 917
(Jan. 22, 2002).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Boat Safety Act of 1971 was
enacted to authorize the creation of
federal safety standards for recre-
ational boats used on the navigable
waters of the United States. At the
time of its enactment, more than 40
million Americans were engaged in
recreational boating in approximate-
ly 9 million boats. In addition, usage
was increasing at the rate of about
4,000 boats per week. Naturally, the
increase in recreational boating was
accompanied by a marked increase
in accidents, deaths, and injuries.
Congress estimated that from
1965-1970, nearly 7,000 Americans
died in boating mishaps.
Congress surmised that the lack of
adequate federal regulation was con-
tributing to the hazards of recre-
ational boating. As of 1971, only two
laws affected recreational boat
users-the Motor Boat Act of 1940
and the Federal Boating Act of
1958. Both laws imposed require-
ments principally relating to light-
ing, fire extinguishers, and boat
numbering. They did not address
federal construction or design stan-
dards for boats or motors. Thus,
Congress concluded that these two
statutes were not sufficient to
improve safe boating.
Against this background, the Boat
Safety Act of 1971 was enacted. The
major thrust of the legislation was
to grant the Coast Guard the
authority to promulgate design and
construction standards for recre-
ational boats. Congress observed
that similar authority already exist-
ed with respect to aircraft and
motor vehicles. Congress further
noted that, although safety stan-
dards for larger commercial vessels
had existed for many years, recre-
ational vessels had never before
been a focus of federal law.
Under the act, the Coast Guard's
authority to issue safety standards is
permissive and not mandatory. 46
U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1). Moreover, the
act sets out a number of limitations
on the circumstances under which
the Coast Guard may exercise its
rulemaking authority. For example,
the act prohibits the Coast Guard
from establishing regulations that
would compel substantial alteration
of existing recreational vessels
unless it determines that the regula-
tion is both necessary to avoid a
substantial risk of personal injury to
the public and appropriate in rela-
tion to the degree of hazard that
compliance will correct. 46 U.S.C.
§ 4302(c)(2). In addition, before
establishing any safety regulations,
the Coast Guard is required to con-
sult with the National Boating Safety
Advisory Council (the Advisory
Council). 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(4).
Finally, before issuing any regula-
tions under the act, the Coast
Guard must comply with the formal
rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
The act contains two provisions
addressing the effect of Coast Guard
regulations on state law. First,
Congress included a preemption
clause providing, in pertinent part,
that unless permitted by the
Secretary of Transportation, "a
State or political subdivision of a
State may not establish, continue in
effect, or enforce a law or regulation
establishing a recreational vessel or
associated equipment performance
or other safety standard ... that is
not identical to a regulation pre-
scribed under the Act." 46 U.S.C.
§ 4306. Second, Congress included
a savings clause, providing that
compliance with the act or
standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under the act does not
relieve a person from liability at
common law or under state law. 46
U.S.C. § 4311(g). The preemption
provision and the savings clause are
the only provisions in the act to
address the preemptive effect of
federal regulations.
In May 1988, at the request of the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Advisory
Council appointed a five-person
Issue No. 1
subcommittee to assess the argu-
ments for and against some form of
mechanical guard to protect against
propeller strikes. In November
1989, the subcommittee recom-
mended that the Coast Guard take
no regulatory action to require pro-
peller guards. Shortly thereafter, the
Advisory Council accepted the sub-
committee report and adopted its
recommendation. Finally, the Coast
Guard, in turn, adopted the
Advisory Council's recommendation
that it take no regulatory action to
require propeller guards.
"Preemption" occurs in three prin-
cipal ways. First, Congress may
expressly preempt state law. English
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
78 (1990). Second, Congress may
override state law by indicating its
intent to occupy the field. Id. At 79.
Third, state law may conflict with
federal law, either by making it
impossible to comply with both
state and federal requirements or by
creating an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of
Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Preemption is a
matter of statutory interpretation
that turns on the language, struc-
ture, and purposes of the enact-
ment. City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
638 (1973). All nine federal courts
to consider this issue have conclud-
ed that propeller-guard claims are
preempted on one or more preemp-
tion grounds. Lady v. Neal Glaser
Marine, 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.
2000); Lewis v. Brunswick Corp.,
107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113
(1998); Carstensen v. Brunswick
Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995);
Moss v. OMC, 915 F.Supp. 183 (E.D.
Cal. 1996); Davis v. Brunswick
Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga.
1993); Shield v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 822 F.Supp. 81 (D.Conn.
1993); Shields v. OMC, 776 F.Supp.
1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Parker v.
OMC, (S.D. Miss. 1991); accord
Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557
N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997); Farner v.
Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562
(I1l. App. 1992).
Sprietsma argues that this case is
governed by a strong presumption
against preemption. Where
Congress has legislated in a field the
states have traditionally occupied,
one starts with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the
states are not to be superseded by
federal law unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.
This presumption is at its strongest
when the question is, as here,
whether Congress intended to pro-
hibit the states from protecting
the health and safety of their
citizens through the exercise of
such traditional and core police
powers as the provision of common-
law tort remedies.
In this regard, Sprietsma contends it
is particularly significant whether
the federal statute provides any sub-
stitute for the traditional court pro-
cedure for collecting damages for
injuries caused by tortuous conduct.
The Boat Safety Act does not pro-
vide any such substitute. In the
absence of such a substitute, plain-
tiffs who could prove that their
physical injuries resulted from the
wrongful conduct of defendants
under state law would be left wholly
without any remedy. Such a result
should not readily be attributed to
Congress. In addition, numerous
prior decisions of the Supreme
Court have made clear that, absent
a direct conflict with federal law,
the states' police powers in the
areas of health and safety may be
exercised concurrently with the fed-
eral government's jurisdiction over
maritime matters.
Petitioner also maintains that his
tort claim is expressly preserved by
Boat Safety Act's savings clause. The
savings clause provides that compli-
ance with the act or standards, reg-
ulations, or orders prescribed under
the act does not relieve a person
from liability at common law or
under state law. Sprietsma believes
that such language precludes any
finding of express preemption.
Petitioner's belief is based on Geier
v. American Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (1999). In Geier, the
Supreme Court construed a similar-
ly worded savings clause in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act as precluding any express
preemption of common-law claims.
Further, Sprietsma believes that the
act's preemption clause does not
preempt common-law tort claims.
According to petitioner, the most
cursory review of the plain wording
of the preemption clause shows that
Congress did not preempt common-
law claims. The clause only pre-
empts any "law or regulation" estab-
lishing a recreational vessel or asso-
ciated equipment performance or
other safety standard that is not
identical to a regulation prescribed
under the act. The most notable fea-
ture of this provision is the absence
of any reference to common-law
claims. Congress has shown its abil-
ity to refer to "common law" when
it intends to include it within the
scope of a preemption clause.
Indeed, the reference to "common
law" in the Boat Safety Act's savings
clause shows that Congress was cog-
nizant of common law in this very
piece of legislation. Thus, Sprietsma
argues, the plain meaning of the
preemption clause defeats any
notion that Congress intended the
preemption provision to preempt
common-law claims.
Further, Sprietsma contends that
the act merely preempts state "laws
or regulations" that are not identical
to federal requirements. Although
(Continued on Page 22)
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"law," standing alone, is susceptible
to a broad reading, language cannot
be interpreted apart from its con-
text. Here, the term law does not
stand in isolation, but rather as a
counterpart to the word regulation,
which is a prescriptive requirement
promulgated by an administrative
rather than legislative body. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly
noted that the word regulation is a
reference only to positive law and
not to common-law duties or dam-
ages liability. Thus, if the Supreme
Court is to adhere to the oft-stated
assumption that Congress's legisla-
tive purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used,
the phrase law or regulation cannot
plausibly be read to encompass peti-
tioner's common-law tort claims.
Contrary to the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision, petitioner also
argues that its lawsuit is not
impliedly preempted. "Implied pre-
emption" arises only when there is
a conflict between federal and state
law. A conflict occurs when it is
impossible for a private party to
comply with both laws or because
the state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes of
Congress. This "impossibility"
analysis is not applicable to this
case because it is undisputed that
the Coast Guard has not regulated
propeller guards and that nothing in
federal law would prohibit respon-
dent from installing propeller guards
on its boat engines. The question
under implied preemption, there-
fore, is whether petitioner's tort
claim somehow stands as an obsta-
cle to Congress's purpose in enact-
ing the Boat Safety Act.
Sprietsma also asserts that his
claims do not in any way stand as
an obstacle to Congress's purposes.
To the contrary, petitioner asserts
that his claims are entirely consis-
tent with the overriding goal of the
Boat Safety Act, which is to pro-
mote safe, recreational boating.
When passing the act, Congress rec-
ognized that existing standards for
boat safety were inadequate, and
that more needed to be done to pro-
tect the public from unsafe recre-
ational boats. Common-law actions
help to promote this goal by identi-
fying safer products and raising pub-
lic awareness of the hazards of
unguarded propellers. Thus,
Sprietsma contends, lawsuits such
as his actually further Congress's
primary goal-safer boating.
Petitioner also asserts that his
claims do not conflict with the
Coast Guard's rationale in not
requiring propeller guards.
Sprietsma maintains that the Coast
Guard's decision was not based on a
finding that propeller guards are
dangerous, but rather on its con-
cerns that (1) the existing data
could not meet the stringent rule-
making standards of the act (which
require a finding that any rule com-
pelling the substantial alteration of
existing boats be necessary to avoid
a "substantial risk of personal injury
to the public") and (2) there was no
technically feasible solution to the
problem of unguarded boat pro-
pellers in all modes of boat opera-
tion. Neither of these rationales
would be undermined by a jury ver-
dict holding a manufacturer liable
for failing to include a particular
propeller guard on a particular
engine.
Finally, Sprietsma argues that the
Supreme Court's recent decision in
Geier, in which the Court found
implied preemption of tort claims
under the National Highway Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(NHTSA), is not applicable. Geier
involved a highly complex federal
safety standard that did, in fact, reg-
ulate the use of airbags. In Geier,
the Supreme Court confronted
"Standard 208," which required
auto manufacturers to phase in the
use of passive restraint devices in
passenger automobiles gradually.
Standard 208 deliberately sought
variety by setting a performance
requirement
for passive restraint devices and
allowing manufacturers to choose
among different passive restraint
mechanisms, such as airbags,
automatic belts, or other passive
restraint technologies to satisfy
that requirement.
Against that backdrop, Geier held
that a common-law damage action
holding a manufacturer liable for its
failure to install an airbag would
conflict with NHTSA's goal of
encouraging a mixture of passive
restraint devices. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held Standard 208
impliedly preempted any state law
tort claims. Petitioner argues that
the facts here could not be farther
from those in Geier. Unlike the
complex set of regulatory obliga-
tions imposed by Standard 208,
which affirmatively encouraged a
mixture of passive restraint devices,
there is no federal regulation what-
soever governing propeller guards.
Thus, unlike Geier, there is no fed-
eral regulatory framework with
which Sprietsma's common-law
claims could possibly conflict.
Therefore, no implied preemption
can be found.
As an initial matter, Mercury Marine
responds that petitioner's common-
law tort claim is barred by federal
maritime law. Federal maritime
jurisdiction is an area outside the
traditional police powers of the
states. Safe boating is not and never
has been the subject of traditional
state regulation. The Boat Safety
Act is a comprehensive federal
statute. Congress assigned the task
of establishing uniform design stan-
dards to the Coast Guard. After 18
months of study, the Advisory
Council recommended against a
Issue No. 1
propeller guard requirement. The
Advisory Council reasoned that
such a requirement would impair
public safety, degrade fuel economy,
and confront manufacturers with
insurmountable feasibility problems.
In turn, the Coast Guard refused to
mandate propeller guards, pointing
to problems of economy and feasi-
bility and noting that available acci-
dent data did not support such a
requirement. The appropriate
authorities made a considered deci-
sion to forgo federal regulation of
propeller guards. Under maritime
law, that decision is controlling.
Therefore, there can be only one
federal rule on propeller guards.
Respondent also argues that the
statute's preemption clause express-
ly bars petitioner's claim. The pre-
emption clause mandates that no
state may establish or enforce any
law requiring an item of boat equip-
ment that is not "identical" to a
Coast Guard regulation. The act's
plain language demonstrates that
Sprietsma's claim is preempted. He
is seeking to establish and enforce a
rule of state law requiring propeller
guards on a recreational vessel, but
that rule is not identical to any
Coast Guard regulation. Clearly,
states may not establish or enforce
any standards that are not identical
to federal standards.
Further, respondent asserts, the
Boat Safety Act's preemption clause
has far broader application than the
preemption clause in Geier. The
clause in Geier preempted state law
only when a federal motor-vehicle
safety standard was in effect. Under
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(MVSA), states were free to impose
safety standards if no federal stan-
dard was in effect. Under the Boat
Safety Act, respondent argues, the
decision not to require a federal
standard preempts any state stan-
dards. Thus, when petitioner relies
on Geier in contending that the
Coast Guard's decision not to
require propeller guards cannot
have preemptive effect because
that decision was not embodied
in a formal safety standard, he
overlooks the crucial difference
between the statutory preemption
clauses. Preemption under the
MVSA was triggered only by the
promulgation of a federal safety
standard, but according to Mercury
Marine, preemption under the Boat
Safety Act extends to the absence as
well as the presence of federal regu-
lation. Therefore, the Boat Safety
Act's preemption clause bars
Sprietsma's claim.
The respondent also argues that the
legislative history of the Boat Safety
Act confirms that Congress pre-
empted the "boat design standards"
field. The House report on the act
stated that recreational boats
should be built in accordance with
standards prescribed by one
federal agency. Similarly, the
Senate report's conclusion that
uniform standards are needed to
avoid unduly impeding interstate
commerce supports the establish-
ment of uniform construction and
equipment standards at the federal
level. The Boat Safety Act thus
ensures that recreational boat man-
ufacturers can comply with one
standard rather than widely varying
local requirements.
Mercury Marine further contends
that the Boat Safety Act's "savings
clause" cannot be read to save peti-
tioner's defective design claim.
Respondent argues the clause does
not apply to defective design claims
at all and that the legislative history
confirms this reading. The legisla-
tive history shows that Congress
added the savings clause as a "tech-
nical" amendment to clarify that a
manufacturer's compliance with
promulgated standards would not by
itself relieve it from any tort liability
that could pertain-i.e., for breach
of warranty or negligence. The
Senate report explains that the pur-
pose of the savings clause was to
assure that in a product liability
suit, mere compliance by a manu-
facturer with the minimum stan-
dards promulgated under the federal
act would not be a complete defense
to liability under state law. Thus,
the savings clause merely bars man-
ufacturers from relying on compli-
ance with federal law as an absolute
defense when state law properly
plays a role.
Several types of common-law
actions are preserved by the savings
clause. First, as the legislative histo-
ry indicates, the savings clause does
not permit manufacturers to avoid
liability for breach of contractual
warranties. Second, the savings
clause preserves claims against boat
owners and operators for negligent
operation. The supervision of safe
boat operation and use is appropri-
ately within the purview of state or
local concern. Third, manufacturers
may be sued for negligently manu-
facturing or installing marine prod-
ucts. For example, a manufacturer
could be held liable for selling defec-
tive start-in-gear devices that would
allow motors to start with moving
propellers. Respondent asserts that
most common-law claims involving
marine products will fall within one
of these three categories. Therefore,
the savings clause does have broad
application, but it does not save
defective design suits.
Respondent adamantly maintains
that permitting petitioner's claim to
proceed will frustrate the purpose of
the Boat Safety Act. In enacting the
act, Congress intended to replace a
patchwork of state regulations with
a single, uniform, feasible, economic
set of safety rules established by
an expert agency and imposed on a
prospective basis. The Boat Safety
(Continued on Page 24)
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Act protects those who mass-
produce boats or motors from hav-
ing to satisfy varying (and potential-
ly conflicting) state design standards
that would interfere with interstate
commerce. According to Mercury
Marine, to allow individual state
court juries to impose damages,
including punitive damages, against
manufacturers for their failure to
install propeller guards would clear-
ly frustrate Congress's intention to
achieve uniformity in this field.
Coincidentally, petitioner's claim
would clearly frustrate the Boat
Safety Act's policy of protecting
interstate commerce.
It is no answer, argues Mercury
Marine, to say that this case
involves only the imposition of dam-
ages, and not the setting of inconsis-
tent standards. Such an argument
disregards the regulatory effect of
tort law. A rule of state tort law
imposing a duty to install certain
safety equipment by its terms would
require manufacturers of all similar
products to install such equipment.
A verdict holding a manufacturer
liable for not installing a propeller
guard would obligate the manufac-
turer to retrofit all similar motors.
Its effect would not be limited to a
particular boat engine. Thus,
Congress's interest in uniformity
would be directly implicated by
inconsistent tort judgments.
Sprietsma argues that holding a
manufacturer liable for failing to
include a particular propeller guard
on a particular boat engine would
not frustrate the Coast Guard's judg-
ment that no universally acceptable
propeller guard is required.
Respondent, however, maintains
that this reflects a fundamental mis-
understanding of the problem.
Outboard motors are not custom-
made for particular boats; they are
made to fit any boat with an appro-
priate horsepower rating. Any pro-
peller guard must be hydrodynami-
cally and structurally compatible
with the intended propulsion unit
and the hull on which the motor
is used.
There are thousands of hull designs
and hundreds of propulsion units,
and manufacturers have no way of
knowing which of the vast array of
boats will be paired with their
motors. Thus, the question is not
whether a particular motor should
be fitted with a particular propeller
guard, but how a guard could be
designed that would be compatible
with the full range of boats on
which the motor might be used.
As the Coast Guard concluded, no
universally acceptable propeller
guard is available or technically
feasible, and retrofitting millions of
boats would certainly be a major
economic undertaking. Congress
carefully drafted this statute to
prevent just such an undertaking,
absent satisfying stringent statutory
requirements.
Respondent also contends that per-
mitting petitioner's claim to proceed
would violate the Boat Safety Act's
ban on substantial alteration of
existing boats. Congress determined
that safety standards should be
established and enforced on a
prospective basis. The Coast Guard
may not compel substantial alter-
ation of existing recreational vessels
or items of associated equipment
absent a finding that the cost is jus-
tified in light of the risk of injury. 4
U.S.C. § 4302(c)(3). The legislative
history indicates that the term sub-
stantial alteration encompasses
economic as well as physical consid-
erations, and that great caution
should be exercised in applying
standards to existing boats because
of the great burden that would be
imposed on both manufacturers and
the boating public. A common-law
propeller guard requirement would
plainly frustrate the Boat Safety
Act's ban on imposing substantial
alterations on existing boats. Such a
requirement would work a major
redesign of the boat motor's drive
system. Moreover, tort law
inevitably operates retrospectively,
and manufacturers would be pres-
sured by tort judgments to modify
millions of outboard motors to avoid
open-ended civil liability.
Finally, Mercury Marine maintains
that a common-law damages action
for failure to install propeller guards
is impliedly preempted by the Coast
Guard's decision not to require pro-
peller guards on recreational boats.
The Coast Guard considered the
benefits and risks of a single piece
of equipment and made a judgment
that the purposes of the Boat Safety
Act would best be served if the item
was not required. The act reflects a
deep concern for uniformity and
decision making by a single expert
regulator. The Coast Guard followed
the act's requirements to the letter
and decided not to require propeller
guards. That decision plainly has
the character of a ruling that no
such regulation would be appropri-
ate or approved pursuant to the pol-
icy of the Boat Safety Act.
Accordingly, it must be given pre-
emptive effect.
SIGNIFICANCE
Federal preemption of state law is a
necessary incident of the
Constitution's supremacy clause,
which provides that federal law is
superior to and overrides state law
when they conflict. Art. IV, § 2.
Federal preemption can be either
express or implied. Express preemp-
tion occurs when a federal statute
expressly preempts an area for fed-
eral regulation only. Implied pre-
emption occurs when a court con-
cludes that state involvement in an
area would conflict with the funda-
mental purpose of a federal statute.
Boating is one of America's favorite
pastimes. Unfortunately, each year
Issue No. 1
many thousands of people are
injured or killed in boating mishaps.
Often the aggrieved party seeks rec-
ompense through state product lia-
bility law. One of the common
grounds for placing liability on a
manufacturer is that its product was
defectively designed. In 1971,
Congress passed the Federal Boat
Safety Act. Pursuant to the act, the
Coast Guard concluded that a pro-
peller guard on recreational motor
boats was not required. Thus, no
regulation was promulgated requir-
ing propeller guards.
This case presents the interesting
question of whether the Boat Safety
Act preempts tort claimants from
pursuing a product liability action
against a manufacturer for an
alleged design defect when the
responsible federal agency has con-
cluded that the particular design is
not required. In addition to answer-
ing that specific question, the
Court's opinion may help clarify the
scope of implied preemption gener-
ally, an issue that is often at the
heart of the "federalism" debate
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